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ARQ Enterprises was formed by the merger of Andersen, Rolvaag, and Quie Corporations. Its three divisions retain the names of the former companies and operate with complete autonomy. Corporate management evaluates the divisions and division management according to return on investment. The Rolvaag and Quie divisions are currently negotiating a transfer price for a component that Quie manufactures and Rolvaag needs. Quie, which sells the component already into a market that it expects to grow rapidly, currently has excess capacity. Rolvaag could buy the component from other suppliers. Three transfer prices are under consideration: Rolvaag has bid $3.84 for the component, which is Quie's standard variable manufacturing cost plus a 20% markup. Quie has offered the component to Rolvaag at $5.90, which is its regular selling price in the marketplace ($6.50) minus variable selling and distribution expenses. ARQ management, which has no established policy on transfer pricing, has offered the compromise price of $5.06, which is the standard full manufacturing cost plus 15%. Both the Quie and Rolvaag divisions have rejected the compromise price. Refer to the pricing chart for a summary of this information ![]() Questions A. What effect might each of the three proposed prices have on the Quie division management's attitude toward intracompany business? B. Would a negotiation of a price between Quie and Rolvaag be a satisfactory method to establish a transfer price in this situation? Explain your decision. C. Should ARQ corporate management become involved in resolving this transfer price controversy? Explain your decision. |